Introduction
The empirical goal of this paper is to examine the structure and meaning of a common DP construction, the kind-construction, shown in (1), against the background of partitives (2) and OF/Z possessives (3). The paper aims to show that a proper analysis of partitives and of/z possessives can be naturally extended to the kind-construction, leading to a unified treatment of these forms which explains many of their syntactic and semantic peculiarities. The account will rest on a relatively strict mapping between functional projections and meaning-types within the noun phrase, and on the existence of a semantic operator which complements the semantic function of the definite determiner. The theory also assigns a prominent semantic role to DP-internal copy operations, combined with a presuppositional approach to definite determiners. From a cognitive standpoint, the proposal has consequences for the proper treatment of noun phrase semantics. In particular, I will claim that the certain subconstituents of the noun phrase have associated hierarchies of kinds and subkinds, and that these hierarchies are directly accessible to the language faculty much in the same way information about 'number' is accessible. If this approach is correct, the information that a given category can be subdivided into a number of 'natural' subclasses moves from general world-knowledge to the far more restricted range of facts that have direct, privileged access to the grammar.
The paper is structured as follows. First, I will sketch some peculiarities of the kind-construction, and discuss Wilkinson's (1991) and approach to the problem. Next, I will bring partitives and of/z possessives into the picture, refining a unified analysis of these constructions proposed in Kayne (1994) and Barker (1997) and checking its predictions with respect to the range of determiners that can appear with these forms. In section 4 I will turn to the determiner restrictions specific to the kind-construction, and attribute them to the combined constraints of a derivation akin to that of of/z possessives and a special discourse property of kinds which I will term Anti-anaphora. I will then proceed to give derivations for the kind-construction in its various orders, and conclude with a corpus-based review of the possible patterns of (mis)agreement between the two nominal elements in the construction.
The puzzle of the kind-construction
The kind-construction comes in two orders, kind-initial (1)a and kind-final (1)b. Descriptively speaking, the construction is the combination of a common noun (the content noun) with a noun from a special class, "kind", "type", "sort", "variety", "species", etc. (hereafter, I will take "kind" as a representative, though corpora searches have been run on "kind", "type" and "sort" combined).
The first analysis of the kind-initial construction is due to Carlson (1977) . Wilkinson (1991) and (1995) put the two orders in relation, and discuss some peculiarities of these forms. In particular, Wilkinson observes that kind-initial DPs introduced by definite determiners behave in certain contexts as indefinites. They can appear in There-sentences:
(4) a. * There are those books in the library.
b.
There are those kinds of books in the library.
Meaning: "There are books of those kinds... "
Second, they can function as predicate nominals (a point also made in Williams 1983, and discussed in McNally 1992) (5) John has been every kind of doctor throughout his career.
Cf. *"John has been every doctor."
Finally, they can be bound by adverbs of quantification just like indefinites: (6) can mean "Most equations of that kind have 2 different solutions".
(6) That kind of equation usually has two different solutions.
Semantically, "This kind of car" appears in canonical generic sentences and in positions typically reserved to kinds.
(7) That kind of book reads easily.
(8) Johnson invented this kind of switch in 1956.
(9) That kind of animal is common/rare/widespread.
However, it can also be used in episodic sentences:
£ (10) This kind of book is on that table.
(11) I have this kind of book here.
The meaning of the kind-final construction depends on the determiner that introduces it. With an overt determiner the kind reading is blocked (12)a,b,c. Only with the 'null plural' determiner ('bare plural') can the DP denote a kind (12) To this, we should add the syntactic observation that in languages like Italian, where preposition stranding is impossible, the PP "of this kind" cannot be extracted (13)a, though "this kind" can be extracted stranding "of car" (13)b.
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In this paper, I will not address this meaning directly, regarding it as an inference, that is, not a strictly grammatical phenomenon. Literally speaking, kinds can be rare or widespread, be invented of eradicated-but they cannot 'be on that table'. I will assume that when they appear to do so, it is because kinds sometimes do things via a representative, a realization (the first light-bulb to be created, and the last dinosaur to die). If the event of a specific book being on a certain table acquires a particular significance (e.g. no books of that kind have ever been on the table), then (10) can be uttered, as a general consequence of an episodic fact, which is not what the sentence is literally about. How do these facts obtain? In the next section I will present Wilkinson's answer. Wilkinson's (1991) and (1995) builds on Carlson's (1977) analysis for the kind-initial case, which assigns to "kind" the type of an adjective, a function taking a common noun denotation and returning another one (CN/CN), with structure:
Wilkinson's solution: "kind" as a modifier
In favour of this structure, Carlson points out that in some dialects of English the determiner may disagree with the kind-noun to agree with the content noun ("Those kind of people"). Wilkinson extends the analysis by assigning the initial determiner to the "kind" constituent, so that both in kind-initial and kind-final position the DP "that kind" can be a modifier of the content noun, the actual head of the construction. The correct bracketing becomes: Suggestive evidence that "that kind" may function as a modifier even before N comes from Partee's (1987) analysis of a construction containing the nouns "size", "colour", "length", etc. (16). The same tests showing indefiniteness in (4)-(6) also apply to these 'size'-nominals (e.g. "there was every size of dress on sale").
(16) a.
A dress (of) that size / That size (of) dress is hard to find. b. That length (of) skirt will be in style. c. They don't make that colour (of) paint / paint (of) that colour anymore.
According to Wilkinson, size-and kind-nouns fall in the same class, and are interpreted in a Montegovian framework by means of the following set of rules. First, the "of" in the kind-final position translates at Chierchia's (1984) operator, the 'predication operator', which creates a property out of an individual. "That kind" is accordingly constructed as an individual. "That" is rendered with the operator: "The individual x" , which is a kind". Applying "of", a binary operator, we get: (18) of that kind = z[ ( y[kind(x" )
which is conjoined with the common noun "animal" like a normal relative clause.
(19) animal of that kind
When "that kind" appears in initial position, it is type-shifted by an invisible operator to the semantic role of modifier, as in "This size (of) dress", a-là Partee. Notice that "of" is meaningless in this case (if it were meaningful, the order of its two arguments would be the opposite of what is needed). The kind-nominal replaces the indefinite (presumably, appearing in [Spec,DP] ), but the content noun is not C-commanded by the determiner, so it cannot be bound by it. Therefore, it ultimately receives an existential interpretation via discourse-based mechanisms, in a Kamp/Heim vein.
indefinite meaning
What about cases where "That kind of animal" behaves as a full-fledged definite DP? Here Wilkinson follows Carlson's structure, in (14) , assuming that "kind" is (ambiguously) translated as a common noun modifier, kind . The determiner is now in its natural position outside the kind constituent, free to bind the content noun. Simplifying the semantics of "that", this yields:
R0 is the realization relation holding between an object z' and the kind x% to which z' belongs. (21) means: the set of properties of a certain kind x" , such that each object which is one of the realizations of x must also be an animal. That is, the generalised quantifier built on a particular subkind of animal.
One open problem for this approach, noted by Wilkinson, comes from sentences like (22): (22) A cat of every kind disappeared "Every kind" must take wide scope over "a", since, as Carlson notes, no object may belong to two different subkinds of the same kind. Thus, if in a room we have a dog which is both a Labrador and a watch-dog, I cannot claim to have two kinds of dog(s) in the room: all subkinds of a kind must be disjoint. However, in the resulting translation, "every" ranges over all kinds in general, not just all kinds of cats.
That is, for every x which is a kind (of cat, of dog, of old sock, etc.) a cat which is an instance of that kind disappeared-intuitively, not the right result. Once again, the problem surfaces in the parallel domain of 'sizenominals': "A dress of each size" strictly ranges over sizes of dresses. One might think that the problem is resolved pragmatically. Since we know that talking about cats of the canine kind makes little sense, we just disregard all but the relevant, feline cases. But this doesn't seem to be enough. First, pragmatic accommodation can be suspended by appropriate lexical devices, e.g. "literally" plus stress.
(24) Literally every student came (to Doomsday).
(25) A cat of literally every kind disappeared.
(25) still only means: the full set of kinds of cats. Second, accommodation isn't possible in what would seem a very similar case, based on the part-whole relation.
(26) a. A page of each object in the museum disappeared.
b. The proboscis of every animal in the savana trumpeted.
These sound quite odd if we know that the museum's collection only partially consists of books, the savana, of elephants. Yet, by the same token, accommodation should be able to filter out all the non-book/elephant objects, leaving only objects having the appropriate parts.
Discussion of Wilkinson's approach
While I take Wilkinson's approach to be correct in the general lines, the Montegovian requirement for surface structure compositionality forces her to technical choices that call for a deeper explanation. One is the treatment of the particle "of"-sometimes meaningful, sometimes meaningless, depending on the modifier's position. Moreover, this semantic shift is at odds with optionality, since for some speakers "of" is obligatory with "size" or "length" only in the order in which it should be meaningless (i.e. "That length *(of) skirt" but "A skirt (of) that length"), and never with "kind". Prima facie, some degree of optionality for "of" fits nicely with its translation as , the predication operator.
is also the translation for "be" (cf. Partee's 1987 be operator). When tense is not an issue "be" can indeed be optional. (27) I consider [John (to be) the best rap singer in town]
A deeper look at the kind construction reveals, however, that "of" cannot in fact be translated as a predicator. If it could, "of that kind" would be synonymous with 'having the property of being that kind', a predicate which strictly speaking can only be true of kinds (see: "Looking for a mostly harmless kind of being?
Man/??John is one"). Translating "of" as conflates being a kind with being an instance of a kind. The difference is particularly clear in Italian, where "be" and "of" appear together in the copular construction. In this language, "di/of" is obligatory with kind/size-nouns when predicating over objects, impossible when predicating over abstract properties or kinds. (28) The (b) cases are identity statements between higher-order properties and kinds (and as such freely invertible: "That colour on the wall is the red of Pompei"). The (a) cases display a more interesting pattern. Consider the "kind" case. As soon as a content noun is added after the kind-nominal, "of/di" becomes entirely impossible, in Italian as in English. The same pattern obtains with "size/length/style". Why are post-copular "of" and a content noun mutually exclusive? And what is post-copular "of" anyhow? To answer, notice that the DPs "that kind" or "that size" in final position cannot be pronominalised with "it/esso".
(31) a. * As for that kind, an animal of it was first described by Darwin. b. * A proposito di quel tipo, un animale di esso e' stato descritto da Darwin.
(32) a. * As for this unusual size, a skirt of it has just been made. b. * Quanto a questa insolita taglia, una gonna di essa e' appena stata creata.
Not that kind/size-nominals in general cannot be pronominalised with "it":
(33) As for this kind of animal, a description of it was first done by Darwin.
(34) As for this size of skirt, it is rather hard to find.
The simplest explanation is that (31) and (32) are out because "animal" or "skirt" should come from a position that has been obliterated by the pronoun: an internal argument position of the kind/size nominal, complement or internal subject. For concreteness, let's assume this position to be the complement.
If this is the case, "kind" and "size" are always unsaturated functions. A kind is always a kind of something, and nouns like "size", "length" or "style" always select for some object of an appropriate semantic type (witness *"This size of water"). Wilkinson's puzzle now falls into place: in "A cat of every kind" we are quantifying over kinds of cats because "cat" is an argument of "kind". Moreover, the non-extractability of "of that kind" follows, if "animal" has moved to the specifier of the XP headed by "of": the extraction of the X0 would break a maximal category. , (29) is also explained (along with the ill-formedness of (30)) if we assume that an empty pronominal corresponding to the content noun has raised to [Spec,XP] , over "kind/size":
The "of" that appears in this context is reminiscent of the one we see in English nominals, e.g. "This is [too much of a problem]", but also in the Dutch "Die pracht van een Westertoren" lit. That beauty of a Westertoren (Den Dikken 1996) , French "quelqu'un de célèbre" lit. someone of famous (Kayne 1994) and Italian "Molto di più" lit. much of more (Zamparelli 1995) , etc, all of which have been associated with fronting of some DP-internal constituent.
In the next sections, the structure in (35) will be reexamined and considerably refined. Before turning to semantic aspects, however, we should consider whether what has raised in the kind-final (35) A search on a 2109064-sentence fragment of the British National Corpus9 reveals that this pattern has features that distinguish it from the normal kind-construction. To begin with, it is quite rare (108 occurrences against 9633 for the singular kind-initial construction alone: [DET KIND of N@ " B A C ]); second, it is nearly always introduced by "what" (59 cases) or "some" (29 cases). In most cases, the content noun is used with a (negative) connotation. The most likely source of this construction, then, is the 'N-of-an-N' construction studied by Napoli (1989) and Den Dikken (1996) , in (38).
(38) a. A scum bag of a father b. That rascal of a Rebecca (37) is simply the interrogative counterpart of this construction, which will not be analysed in this study.D
Saying that in the kind-construction the content noun is at some level an argument of the kind-noun does not by itself explain the semantic relation between the two objects. Consider (39) and (40): (39) a. The kind/species of the tiger is in danger of extinction.
b. The kind/species of tigers is in danger of extinction. c. The kind/species Panthera Tigris is in danger of extinction.
(40) a. The kind/species of tiger ??(we just talked about) is in danger of extinction. b. A/That species of tiger is in danger of extinction.
(39)a,b are perhaps slightly marginal, but to the extent they are acceptable, they are synonymous with (39)c and serve to specify which unique kind or species one is talking about. "The" is perfectly appropriate here. The nominals in (40), on the other hand, refer to a set of species, or more precisely, to a set of sub-species of tigers: 'tigers' themselves are not 'a kind of tiger'. "The" is acceptable here only with a restrictive modifier.E Identical situation with size-nouns: "The size of the elephant/elephants scares me" corresponds to (39), "The size of elephant *(you are hunting) scares me", to (40). Again, the definite is only possible with a modifier.
Descriptively speaking, the only difference between the noun phrases in (39) and (40) is whether the element after "kind of" is a full DP (as in "The tiger/Tigers/Panthera Tigris"), or not. But why should the denotation of the whole noun phrase depend on this? The hypothesis that the content noun is an argument of the kind doesn't seem to have anthing to say on this matter.
3 The 'residue' operator in partitives and possessives A step toward a solution of this puzzle is to examine two other English constructions with a similar behaviour, the partitive construction (41) (see Jackendoff 1977 , Ladusaw 1982 , Hoeksema 1984 and the recent collection Hoeksema 1996) and the of/z possessive construction (42) (Barker 1997 , Kayne 1994 . Like "kind" in (40), they cannot take a definite article without a relative clause, a phenomenon that Barker (1997) calls Anti-uniqueness: Finally, like the kind-construction, these constructions must denote a 'proper subpart' of a larger set. So, both (41) and (42) presuppose that John has more than 2 friends.P The last two properties have been tied together in Barker (1997) , within a theory based on general presuppositional properties of the definite article which will form the basis for my own analysis of partitives and of/z possessives. Before describing Barker's idea, I want to spend some words on the semantics that I will be assuming for definites and plurals, and on noun phrase syntax.
A standard assumption in semantics (see Westerstahl 1985 , Partee and Wall 1990 :398, Jong and Verkuyl 1985 is that definite determiners induce presuppositions on their argument set, the denotation of the common noun. In particular, "the" requires for its argument to denote a set with a unique maximal element (cf. Sharvy 1980 , Chierchia 1997 ). In the case of a normal singular, this amounts to a requirement that in the common ground the noun denotes a singleton set (i.e. "The boy" will be felicitous only if there is only one boy salient in the common ground); in the case of a plural, that the set denoted by the noun contains one 'largest element', technically, a supremum. All definites can in fact be treated as 'supremum extractors', differing only in the additional presuppositions they induce on their arguments. For instance, demonstratives presuppose for the sensory context to have played a role in restricting their argument to a supremum-containing set, which is why phrases like "This centre of mass of the Universe" or "That author Italo Calvino" sound odd, even if I am pointing Q Partitive 'PP's can be left-dislocated in English ("Of those people, I have just met two") and clitic-left dislocated in Italian ("Di quelle persone, ne ho conosciuto due") for topicalization purposes. This will fall out from the structure in section 3.1. WH partitive 'PP's are bad in either languages (e.g. *"Of whom did you see two?"), but this is arguably due to the independent fact that WH, as existentials (Kartunnen 1977 , Reinhart 1997 , fail the Partitive Constraint, witness the oddness of partitives+WH in situ: * "I wonder which boy danced with one of which girls". Some counterexamples for of/z possessives are "That nose of his", "Those eyes of hers", which do not imply any uncommon amount of eyes or noses. They are addressed in section 4.2 and in Barker (1997) . McCawley (1988) also claims that "Let me tell you about a problem of mine" is neutral as to whether the hearer has more than one problem. I have nothing to say on this case. my finger to the actual spot or person, and why demonstratives do not go with superlatives (?? "He is that tallest man on Earth"): these phrases already denote a unique entity, so no deixis can make them any more specific. Genitives such as "John's", on their part, will carry the presupposition that their argument is restricted to the supremum-containing set of things that bear a certain relation with John, the 'possessive' relation (however it is spelled out in the context at issue, see Barker 1991 for discussion.) To understand the interplay between this conception of definites and syntax, I need to make explicit the DP structure I will adopts, though I will not try to justify it in any detail here, referring the reader to Zamparelli (1995) .S The structure is an extended DP with multiple projections between D and the N proper (45)a, based on Hudson (1989) , Cinque (1993) , Longobardi (1994) 
The SDP layer ('Strong DP'-I will use 'DP' for the entire extended projection) hosts definites, deictics and other 'strong' determiners (in the sense of Milsark 1974); 'P(redicative)DP' contains any determiner that may appear in a predicate nominal, in particular, indefinites and numerals; KIP (from Zamparelli 1995) hosts the noun's restrictive modifiers, NP the noun itself, plus its internal arguments. This basic structure still does not have room for "all", which must be external to SDP, given "All those fourty-five boys". For the time being, I will assume that floating quantifiers are realized outside SDP, possibly as adjuncts (Sportiche 1988) . Semantically, each layer of DP will take as an argument the denotation of its complement (and possibly, that of its specifier), perform some operation on it and pass on the result to the layer above. The first three layers, SDP, PDP and KIP, have a certain degree of independence; for instance, in Italian or French they can be pronominalized with different pro-forms; 'bare PDPs' may be used as predicate nominals, in "I consider them [5
Focusing on the lower part of the DP, suppose that KIP, the constituent containing NP and its modifers denotes a set of plural individuals (pluralities), in the sense of Link 1983, arranged in a join semi-lattice structure. With sets to represent pluralities, as in Chierchia (1996) (46) as singletons,a a reflex of the fact that this denotation is actually common to both singulars and plurals. Of course, nouns have plural or singular features, and are semantically distinguished by them. My claim is that these features do not play any role in the denotation of KIP, but are carried up (perhaps via raising of the noun itself, as in Cinque 1993) to the PDP layer, where they are interpreted.
PDP hosts numerals, which are combined with the KIP denotation in (46) to return a subset containing only pluralities with the appropriate cardinality. The plural feature, Fb
is interpreted as "2 or more" (47)a, the singular one as "exacly 1" (47)b. Numerals may have an 'at least' interpretation, in which case "2 boys" will denote the same thing as "boys", i.e. (47)a, but more often they have an 'exactly' interpretation (see Kadmon 1987 for discussion), as in (47)c. Notice that this operation cuts off the supremum of (46) in all cases except when the numeral is equal to the cardinality of the supremum itself, i.e. (47) In what follows, I will avail myself of an operator to turn singletons containing atoms into those atoms, when necessity arises.
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I will not discuss here numerals that are not upward-entailing, such as "few" or "less then 4", assuming a negative-polarity treatment along the lines of Ladusaw (1992) ) and Zamparelli (1995:119) .
Definites are hosted one layer up, at SDP. The plural definite determiner "the", applied to [5
boys], denotes the operator Max, which picks out the supremum of the denotation of "boys":
Max returns the element with the highest cardinality, if there is one, and it is otherwise undefined. Notice, now, that when a numeral appears between a definite and the noun, it always has the 'exactly' interpretation. That is, it is impossible to refer to the 4 boys in the salient domain as "The 2 boys", meaning "The 2 or more boys", just like one cannot express the same situation with "The boys are 2", meaning "2 or more". It follows from this that the numeral will have to be chosen to preserve the supremum, since Max would be undefined, if given a denotation like (47)c. In other terms, "The n boys" can be well-formed only if n is the cardinality of the largest group of boys in the common ground, that is, if we are in case (47)d. This derives the fact that numerals in the presence of a definite are always non-restrictive, as originally observed by Carden (1976) .
We are now ready to give Barker's explanation for the 'anti-uniqueness' requirement in (44). Suppose the denotation of the partitive PP "of the boys" is just like (46), but with the supremum removed:
This denotation conforms to the intuition that partitives always denote a proper subset of the DP after "of": the plurality a, b, c, d , i.e. the denotation of "The 4 boys" is not to be found in the denotation of any partitive built on "The 4 boys". Imagine now to feed the denotation in (49) to "The 3". "3" will filter the denotation, yielding (47)c; at this point, however, no single maximal element can be extracted by Max, and the phrase fails its presuppositional requirements. Therefore, "The 3 of the boys" will be out, unless the context intervenes to single out one of the three-element sets as the 'maximal one'. As Barker's (1997) shows, this can be done by introducing an ordering relation ("The first 2 of John's friends"), or by restricting the partitive denotation with a modifer, which explains the necessity of a relative in (44). With this simple mechanism, Barker links together the fact that partitives denote proper subparts and the impossibility of the definite article. But he has to stipulate proper partitivity.
Is there a natural operator in language that will produce the denotation in (49) without stipulations? The answer is yes: the residue operator Re0 , a function which is arguably 'natural' simply in virtue of being the complement-set of a pervasive operator, the definite article, with respect to a common noun denotation. In its more general form, we can define the residue of a set A in the domain D with respect to an element b in D, Re0 (A -b) as:
That is, the set of every element in A expect b. The denotation in (49) can now be obtained from:
But now, looked with syntactic eyes, this structure-a bare noun associated with a definite-should be reminiscent of something. Consider again kinds, partitives and possessives, using Chomsky's (1993) copy-deletion theory of movement to highlight the structures involved: In the previous section, we have seen that it is plausible in (52)a to assume identity between the content noun and an internal argument of the 'kind-nominal'. A recent analysis of the possessive in (52)c (Kayne 1994 ) derives this form by extracting (here, copying) "friends" from under a regular possessive construction, "John's friends", embedded under a partitive DP, with "of" inserted; Barker (1997) obtains the same effect semantically, via the meaning of a special particle 'of
In the ellipsis analysis I am proposing, we copy up a subpart of the definite noun phrase and get either partitives or possessives, depending on which copy we choose not to pronounce-though of course the choice is influenced by syntactic factors. Partitives and of/z possessives can thus be reduced to PF variations of the same structure, the syntactic realization of the residue operator plus a type of 'local' ellipsis. The application of the same grammatical devices will be claimed to give a natural treatment to the kind-construction as well. In the next sections I shall focus on the first two cases, setting the stage for kinds.
Partitives and possessives as realizations of the residue operator
Let's assume human languages have a syntactic projection in charge of expressing the residue operation, call it R(esidue) P(hrase). In English the head of RP is realized as "of". The bare noun and the definite can be accommodated in the specifier and complement of this projection, where they are interpreted by the rule:
In turn, RP is embedded under a PDP, the site of numerals, and an SDP, to host external determiners (as in "Every one of the boys"). Suppose that the phrase in [Spec,RP] is a KIP (cf. also Kayne 1994) , while the one in the complement is a full SDP.
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The general formulation of 'residue' in (50) leaves open several special cases that are ruled out by the ellipsis-based derivation plus the theory of definites I have adopted. For instance, b needs not be a member of A; given the way definites are derived, this will always be the case with regular partitives and of/z possessives, though not always with kinds, as we shall see. Within the range of phenomena considered in this paper, the correlation between residue and a local copy operation is indeed complete: [Spec,RP] (or its immediate subconstituent, with kinds) is always copied from under [Complement,RP] . This may ultimately lead one to regard 'residue' as the semantic reflex of certain copy operations, but the relevant syntactic conditions remain to be investigated. The KIP [good friends] denotes a full lattice of plural individuals (singletons included); RP, the same lattice minus the supremum, and the higher PDP, the set of plural individual good friends which happen to have cardinality 2. Notice that the numeral "two" cannot be derived from the lower definite together with KIP, as suggested in Kayne (1994) . Applied to partitives, this analysis would lead us in a contradiction with the double numeral in "Two of the four friends". Since the denotation of KIP neutralises singular/plural distinctions, source and copy can be semantically identical even in case of number mismatch ("One of my two dogs"), as generally in ellipsis. Partitives with pronouns are also not a problem, as long as we analyse "Two of them" as "Two F(N) of the(m) Ns" (cf. "Two linguists of us linguists"), with "the" realized as its intransitive tween "them" (cf. Sommerstein 1972 , Abney 1987 ) and the semantic features of the missing noun, F(N), retrieved from the pronoun's referent and copied over to [Spec,RP] . This procedure will not overgenerate *"Two linguists of them linguists", though how to bar the equivalent for "us linguists" is unclear.
h £ Semantically, the fact that the two KIPs in (55) are copy-identical plays a crucial role. Out of context, "boys" denotes the set B of all the boys in the domain. "John's boys", on the other hand, will pick out the largest 'plural boy' in the far smaller set of 'boys that have some relation with John'. Clearly, removing this plurality from B and returning the rest of B would not mean to deprive B of its supremum.
boys] in [Spec,RP] is identical to the KIP in the definite, it will denote precisely the subset of boys that would satisfy the presuppositions of the definite, genitive "John's". Removing from it the denotation of the definite will now yield a result like (49), as desired. Copy-identity insures that "child of John's" will never be interpreted as "child" of John's child " (since "child" " and "child " do not denote the same set of children), but it does not mean that "child" and "John's child" will refer to the same person, since we are not coindexing full SDPs, which may refer to atomic individuals, but subparts of them, which refer to (the same) sets of pluralities.
Turning to the syntactic well-formedness conditions of the higher PDP, I suggest that this phrase needs to be licensed by overt lexical material (a PF condition). The presence of a PF-overt KIP in of/z possessives suffices, so in this case the numeral in PDP can be missing or reduced (taking "a" to be a weak form of "one", along the lines of Perlmutter 1970). In the partitive, the PF-erased KIP doesn't have the appropriate features to license the phrase, so a full indefinite must be overt, as in null-nominal constructions. This derives (56).
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One construction that cannot be generated by this approach is "[One of John and Mary] left", which some authors (e.g. Hoeksema 1984) mark as ill-formed. Chris Wilder has pointed out to me that the construction improves with a disjunction: "One of John or Mary". This leads me to suspect that it might not be a genuine partitive. (Every) one of John's friends
The possibility of erasing only the right KIP is syntactically restricted. For unclear reasons, we do not get ?? "Two friends of John's four" or *"Two friends of the four" (vs. ? "I found my three chess pieces but Mary didn't find her four."). We do get, however, "Two friends of those friends you have met yesterday", a construction quite productive in Italian (see Cardinaletti and Giusti 1990) , which lacks any other equivalent of English of/z possessives. Finally, the non-extractability of the of/z possessive 'PP', in '*"Of mine, I have met two friends", follows from the structure above, since it would split R0 from [Spec,RP] . In partitives, on the other hand, the same operation can be seen as raising of the whole RP, possible on general grounds (see footnote 6).
Determiner restrictions in partitives and of/z possessives
The theory developed so far can now be tested upon the restrictions on the range of determiners that may appear in initial (D ) or internal position (D £ ), in partitives and of/z possessives.
Any difference between the two constructions should be explainable solely in terms of their PF difference.
Constraints on D £
Ideally, the only semantic constraint that we want to impose on D £ is that the residue of N and [D £ N] restricted by the cardinality specifications in the higher PDP should not be empty. This happens, of course, when the cardinality in PDP is equal to that of the definite, as in ?? "Two of John's parents" under usual circumstances, or when it is greater. Ladusaw (1982) has shown that the restriction on D £ , known as the "Partitive Constraint" since Jackendoff (1977) , reduces to a filter against quantifiers which are not equivalent to a plural entity: "every/each/most/both/some/...". In a quantifier-raising approach, this can be recast as follows. Consider the ill-formed (58)a:
(58) a. * One of every boy b.
The DP "every boy" raises at LF, giving (58)b. As a consequence, the complement of RP, i.e. the second argument of the residue operator, will be a variable x ranging over all the elements in
. If we calculate the residue with respect to all the possible values for the variable we are left once again with the empty set.
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(58) contrasts in fact with (59), from Ladusaw (1982) . (59) The relative acceptability of (59) suggests that numerals have a specific reading where they do not return a set of pluralities with the appropriate cardinality (as in their weak reading), nor denote a variable ranging over atoms, but rather take a set of pluralities and return a single plurality.
It is unrelevant whether the quantifiers ranges on all the elements in [[KIP] ], atoms and pluralities, or only over atoms, provided this latter possibility is expressed as a presupposed restriction on the KIP denotation. The potentially problematic situation would be one where the left KIP denoted the full lattice, but the quantifier ranged over singulars only. Under my current hypothesis, this would violate copy-identity. Notice also that (58)b assumes that the copy has been done before the DP's descriptive content is removed by QR, otherwise it would simply be impossible to copy [[boys] ]to the first argument of Re
7
. An alternative is that descriptive content can be retrieved via the trace and updated for each value of the variable, but this would give ¢ r G Abbott (1996) has examples like "Probably every speaker will only tell one of [many possible jokes related to their topic]", where the bracketed nominals is quite clearly non-specific. However, she fails to recognize the possibility that such cases are instances of the construction "3 out of 4 dentists (recommend this toothpaste)" (see also "3 dentists out of 4"), arguably not a partitive (witness *"3 out of the people"). Notice that weak "sm" cannot be replaced for "many" in her example, just as in *"3 out of sm dentists". Barker & x:child(x) ... 2 friends" of x's friend" ), even though "x's friends" should denote as good a plurality as "Mary's friends". In an ellipsis approach, this fact can be related to the marginality of (61) and explained in terms of levels of representation. In a possessive DP, the denotation of the possessee is presupposed to be fixed by a possessive relation largely specific to any given triple of context, possessor and possessee. Therefore, in the wide scope reading, the denotation of the possessee changes at LF for each value of the 'possessor' variable. But in (60)b, "friends" must be copied in time to be pronounced, i.e. before LF, when its meaning is still undetermined; in partitives, copying can be delayed to LF (and in a sense, updated for each value of x), hence the difference. Hoeksema (1984) points out that the determiners that can introduce partitives, i.e. the set D , are the same that can appear in null-nominal constructions, i.e. the (possibly complex) Ds acceptable in "John liked two cars and/but I liked D". If partitives are based on ellipsis, this is hardly a coincidence. On the other hand, Hoeksema's generalisation has at least one exception, "all", and it doesn't cover those definites that are acceptable in NP ellipsis (62) Recall that in the present theory all definites require an argument with a supremum. Since a RP denotation provides none, all definites are predicted to be bad, unless they can use further restrictions to reduce their argument to a supremum-containing format. Prima facie, it would seem that for possessives and demonstratives this should be easier than for the simple definite article, since, unlike the article, they can make use of the restrictive properties for which they are especially tailored, i.e. deixis and the possessive relation. The failure of (63) and ( Relative aside, (63)a should mean something like "The friends of John's which have some relationship with me/Mary", but it out. Moreover, unlike the definite article, possessives cannot be rescued by an external relative. Why should this be so? Recall that possessives presuppose a restriction based on the context-dependent relation between possessor and possessee. Suppose that this special relation is fixed once and for all at the KIP or NP level (these are after all the levels at which restrictive modification is performed and thematic roles are assigned).
Constraints on D
In (63), however, the KIP denotation is already fixed by the presuppositions of the lower definite, "John's" or "those"; what surfaces at the RP level is a set of pluralities which may be filtered with a relative, but cannot satisfy the different presuppositions carried by "Mary's". Turning to demonstratives, we find an asymmetry between partitive and of/z. The latter is well formed and quite common in the singular, while (64)b is out (though it improves with an overt numeral). That/This/Those (one(s)) of John's friends Demonstrative+Partitive (64)b suggests that, as with partitives, the deictic content of the demonstrative must be applied to KIP or NP and cannot be used to restrict the output of the residue operator. Indeed, non-deictic, non-presuppositional demonstratives, always restricted by a relative, are as acceptable as the definite article (cf. also Ladusaw 1982) .
[Those of the students who want to enrol in course 200] must have taken 100 before.
The reason why (64)a is acceptable has probably to do with the fact that certain of/z possessives with demonstratives lack proper partitivity (see Narita 1986 cited by Barker, my footnote 7, and the discussion at the end of section 4.2). In Barker's theory, if a 'partitive' has the same denotation of the definite it embeds it also has a supremum, and a definite determiner is predicted to be acceptable. Another asymmetry arises with the quantifier "all":
(66) a. All of John's friends (came to the party). b. ?? All friends of John's (came to the party).
All the speakers I have asked either find (66)b strange, or force it to a kind reading (as in "All dogs bark"). To understand what's happening, we need to sketch out the behaviour of "all" in "All the boys". In the current approach, "The boys" returns a single plurality, composed of atoms; to keep things simple, suppose that "all" distributes over these atoms. I But [friends of John's] doesn't have atoms (or singletons) among its members: the plural feature on "friends" has removed all the atoms from the original denotation of KIP, leaving only pluralities. Therefore, "all" doesn't find a suitable domain of quantification. The situation would be better, semantically speaking, with [friend of John's]-the singular features of "friend" preserves the atoms. But this time the problem is syntax: "all" requires plural agreement with count nouns. If this type of agreement mismatch is checked at PF, we obtain that (66)a-where the left noun is erased-will be acceptable, while (66)b will not. Since numbers above 1 remove atoms just like plural features, this account also predicts the oddness of (67).
P (67) ?? All 4 of the 6 students left
To sum up, I have treated partitives and of/z possessives as the combination of four components: an approach to definites that places the burden of their semantics on the presuppositions they impose on their argument; an application of DP-internal ellipsis, by which the argument of the definite is copied to a spec position and interpreted in both positions; a 'residue' operator which returns a set minus one of its elements, and Barker's (1997) account of anti-uniqueness effects, extended to explain the impossibility of demonstratives and possessors in partitives in terms of a clash between the presuppositions of the higher and lower definites. All of these components have some realization elsewhere in language (e.g. ellipsis), have been proposed independently (e.g. the presuppositional properties of definites) or are arguably 'natural' in the sense of being derived from a 'natural' (i.e. well-attested) operator via a straightforward mathematical operation.
With these ingredients, we have an explanation of anti-uniqueness in partitives and of/z possessives. A natural question is whether all cases of anti-uniqueness can in fact be given the same explanation. In this stronger hypothesis, any time "the" cannot appear without a restrictive modifier, its argument must lack a supremum, due to a combination of ellipsis and the residue operator. In the next section, I will turn to examine this stronger hypothesis in the domain of kinds.
¢ H
Notice that I am not saying that "the/those" plus a relative cannot rely on presuppositions at all, only that, unlike pure definites, they don't always need to. This is important to obtain "A tiger of the kind I study", in the derivation detailed in the next sections.
¢ r Q
The solution would also work in more complex semantics for "all", like the one suggested in Dowty (1986) and Link (1987) , provided it can be maintained that "all" requires atoms in the denotation of its argument. This leaves open the question of how to interpret the generic "All dogs bark". I will not analyse bare plurals in this paper, but the discussion in the next sections suggests that intensional sets of individuals is at least a plausible denotation. This would make "All boys" sufficiently similar to "All the boys" for the present purpose. For reasons why bare plurals cannot appear in partitives, see (Wilkinson 1996) .
The kind construction and its anaphoric properties.
The domain of kinds is complex. The kind construction displays anti-uniqueness effects both in the kind-initial and kind-final order. I will argue that this effect is due to the combination of a residue/ellipsis analysis with a discourse-level phenomenon which effectively barrs anaphoric uses of the definite article with kinds. The analysis of of/z possessives will be crucial in explaining how this fact extends to the content nominal.
Let's look at the kind-final position first. Definites before the content nominal are odd to various degrees (68); they improve when an ordering relation is introduced (69)a or, more marginally, when a relative is present (69) These cases serve as a contrastive introduction to one of the most striking discourse properties of kinds, namely the fact that, even with the best of contexts, a kind nominal with a simple definite article cannot be used to refer back to a previously introduced discourse referent, even if this is a kind. Demonstratives, possessives or articles with a numeral must be used instead. Contrast (73)a (normal object-level reference) with b or c.
(73) a. John" and Jack arrived in London with their mother in 1956.
The / The two / ?These / ?her boys" were naive, but intelligent and hard-working. b. "Pink Delight"" and "Waverly" roses were bred in England by Mr. Pinkerton. *The / / The two / These / His kinds of roses" are quite popular nowaday in Scotland.
¢ r i
The judgments are supported by searches on the BNC fragment. Out of 1896 kind-final cases, only 2 were introduced by a singular "the" without a relative, a superlative or "only"; both had kind-level meaning (e.g. "the helmet of a type complying with one of the specifications referred to in the preceding subparagraph"); 5 were introduced by unmodified plural "the", again with 'kind' meanings (e.g. "The basic characteristics of the cheeses of this type", "The landlords of the traditional type had been supplemented by Londonbased land-holding companies."). No instances of plural or singular demonstratives were found. See table 1 in section 5 for additional details.
c. Among pets, the Greyhound" is as common as the Siamese cat, despite the fact that [ *the / this kind of dog]" requires large spaces.
This property also holds in the kind-final order:
(74) a. The Greyhound" is common in England. I have just seen many dogs of [ *the / this kind]" . b. The Greyhound" is common in England, although a dog of [ *the / this kind]" always suffers in small spaces.
I will refer to this property as (Kind) Anti-anaphora.
a
The existence of anti-anaphora sheds a different light on the partial oddness of definites with the content noun in (68). Closer inspection reveals that the article there is in fact acceptable to the extent it is not used anaphorically (see footnote 18). When coreference with a previously mentioned object is forced, things get worse. Contrast (75) This shows that anti-anaphora also holds for the determiner that introduces the content nominal, though this property does not explain why demonstratives and possessives are perfect in (73) and (74), but not in (68)b or (75)a,b. I will assume for the time being that some kind of anti-uniqueness is also at work with content nouns, and that anti-anaphora per se does not rule out demonstrative or possessives.
Let's take stock. The property I have called 'anti-anaphora' prevents "the" to appear with a kind-or content-noun to yield a definite description that picks up an available discourse referent. The property cannot be due to a problem combining kinds with definite articles, since the two go together in (72) and (70)c. Moreover, it cannot be due to the fact that "kind of tiger" refers to kinds, as opposed to objects like me and Felix; the kind-final construction in (75) does refer to an object, Felix, yet the effect is weaker but still present. What is 'kind anti-anaphora', then? To clarify the issue, let's first state this property in a slightly different form. In the approach adopted so far, anti-anaphora means that the context, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to restrict the argument of the definite determiner enough to obtain a supremum-containing lattice. Normally, mentioning a tiger is sufficient to change the common ground in such a way that an 'appropriately close' definite description such as "The tiger" has no trouble extracting from the context a unique (hence, maximal) singular tiger. Yet, when the definite description is a kind-construction, additional restrictions are necessary. Evidence for this is that the generic cases in (72) are good precisely because the context has no need to restrict the argument of "the": the full set of all types of industrial activity or bank deposits are sought. The question now becomes what blocks context restrictions on kinds in a general frame for interpreting the kind-construction.
The kind-initial order
At the end of section 2.2, I have noted that "A kind of tiger" seems to be in a proper subpart relation with the object denoted by "The kind 'Panthera Tigris' ", i.e. the general species. Having treated proper partitivity as a manifestation of the residue operator, I will approach the kind-initial construction along the same route. Once
¢ r q
The property was noted in Carlson (1977) , and explained as follows. The main assumption is that "kind of animal" must denote a proper subkind, i.e. for each subkind there must be some animal which does not belong to it; however, "the", the iota operator, requires the existence of only one subkind of animal:
. But if this is the case, anything which is an animal must also belong to this single subkind, contrary to the first assumption. I see three problems with this solution. First, it conflates existence and salience. One could very well imagine a situation with many kinds of animals but a single salient one. In this situation, it should be possible to say "The kind of animal" just like we can say "The angle of the triangle" without denying that triangles have 3 angles. Second, proper subkind-hood is stipulated. Third, I don't see any straightforward way to extend this idea to plurals, and in particular to the contrast between (72) and (73). again, to make the residue operator work we need a set (KIP, in partitives/possessives), and an element (the definite built on KIP, there). For the latter role, consider the minimal phrase containing "kind" and its internal argument, the bare noun "tiger", i.e. [ kind [tiger] ], under the hypothesis that "kind" and similar words denote functions from noun denotations (to be spelled out in a moment) to singletons containing individual kinds. Under the assumption that such singletons can be freely turned into the corresponding atoms, "Kind tiger" can denote the same thing as "Panthera Tigris", the proper name of a kind. The derivation, then, begins with [ kind [tiger] ] in the complement of a RP, interpreted as an individual kind. Next, [tiger] is copied to [Spec,RP] and the lower copy is marked for erasure at PF, obtaining something that looks like an of/z possessive with a syntactically reduced definite side: (76) [g h 5
[tiger]" of [
What motivates this structure? As a bare noun, "tiger" cannot go in the argument position of nouns, possibly for reasons of Case, which appears to be linked to higher DP projections (cf. Giusti 1991). If we assume that PF-erasure in the lower position can obviate this problem, a derivation via copy-to-[Spec,RP] becomes a virtual necessity, the only well-formed alternative being to reinterpret "tiger" as a proper name, yielding "The kind 'Tiger' " (a sort of apposition), or replace it with a full SDP denoting a kind, "The kind of [the tiger]". In the singular, this possibility is open only to nominals that refer to 'well-established' kinds, (e.g. "The Coke bottle" but not "The green bottle"), as observed by many authors, see Carlson (1977) , Krifka et al. (1995) . Next, we need to make sure that the the elements in the specifier of RP has the correct denotations. To preserve the parallelism with of/z possessives, [tiger]" should denotes a set of kinds. Simply saying that "tiger" denotes the power set of all singular tigers and that [kind [tiger] ] denotes its maximal element won't do, since this would give us subsets of tigers, not subkinds. Intuitively, not any random collection of tigers gives us 'a kind of tiger'. Moreover, cardinal modifiers such as "3" in "3 kinds" would end up counting instances, not kinds. Finally, the same individual can be a part of many distinct pluralities, but not of many distinct kinds. More precisely, the same individual can be an instance of several kinds created by different criteria (so, Felix can be a 'Bengali tiger' and a 'man-eating tiger'), but as Carlson (1977) 
The denotation of NPs
Indeed, despite the fact that nouns are standardly taken to denote lattices (set of pluralities, see Link 1983 Link , 1987 , there is some evidence that this meaning is available only at a certain point in the derivation, and that nouns start out from the lexicon denoting something different. For one thing, nouns cannot be 'quantified' below the level at which they are modified by numerals (the PDP layer). Any kind of numeric restrictive modification applied to the innermost DP layers fails, including relative clauses that are not selected by the definite article. If at all grammatical, these modifiers are either non-restrictive (hence, I will assume, attached higher, see e.g. Fabb 1990 , Toribio 1992 or with group-reading ("many" = "in a large group"). The same point is made by the ill-formedness of post-N cardinality adjectives in Western-Romance languages. Post-N modifiers are the norm in these languages, and they can be shown to be attached to a position immediately above the N, which is displaced by head-movement (Cinque 1993 ). Yet, we have:
amici friends (*molti) (*many) di of
Maria Maria
This is unexpected if plurals nouns are sets of pluralities to start with-we should in principle be able to restrict such a set at any point in the derivation. Also, it doesn't fit well with an approach in which the noun denotation can be type-shifted by an operator that applies whenever the need for a particular semantic type arises (e.g. Partee 1987 , Chierchia 1996 , Chierchia 1997 . Suppose instead that the lattice denotation I have been assuming all along for KIP is the result of the application of a power-set operator, Pw0 , associated with the head of KIP. The operator applies to an argument which denotes a simple set of individuals and returns a lattice to which numerals can be applied. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume that this set is the denotation of NPs themselves, leaving open how this denotation is compositionally derived from the noun and it closest modifiers. Suppose also that any modifier in [Spec,KIP] is interpreted with other NP modifiers, within the scope of Pw0 :
It is well-known that many noun phrases are ambiguous between a 'kind' and an 'object' reading. "This computer" could refer to my PC, but also to a specific type of computer, with some contexts forcing the kind-reading:
(80) a. Nowadays, every computer is available in at least two models. b. Each car sold in the U.S. undergoes thorough crash tests.
Not all NPs will display this ambiguity; in particular, NPs with stage-level modifiers like "currently available", "present" or "now ready" will not, witness ?? "A kind of now-ready dish / present danger / currently available firemen " (see Carlson 1977 , sec.5.4, Chierchia 1997 . Suppose, then, that NPs that are ambiguous denote either a set of (possibly abstract) objects in the domain or one or more sets of kinds/subkinds that can be built on these objects. Marking kinds with superscript "% ", a sample denotation for the NP "animal" might be:
Max, Felix, Lassie, Dumbo, Rin-Tin-Tin, . . .
b.
animal% , mammals% , tigers% , Bengali-tigers% , cats% , Siamese-cats% , . . .
c.
animal% , edible% , inedible% , best-raw% , best-cooked% , . . . (See Berlin and Raven 1973, Pelletier and Schubert 1989 for discussions on such hierarchies). If we assume, with Chierchia (1997) that the nodes in these hierarchy can be regarded as the sets of their realizations at any given world, £ g the hierarchies above can be extracted from (81)b,c by looking at the subset relations holding between the extensions of elements in the sets (81)b,c; the elements in each possible kind-domain denotations will be partially ordered, and animal% will be a superset of all the other kinds, which will get smaller and smaller, down to the point where we would feel uneasy calling something 'a subkind'. Animal% will therefore be the supremum of all the kind-domain denotations; its extension will be the the (extensional) object-level denotation of the NP, i.e. the set of all animals, (81)a. On the other hand, NPs that do not denote kinds, such as "currently available firemen" will only have object-domain denotations like (81)a, while for NPs that have no
The system would work also if the relation between kinds and their instances was R well-established or contextually salient categorisation as a 'natural class', such as "green bottle" or "old sock", it will be very difficult to derive any kind/subkind hierarchy from the object-level denotation, so the kind-level denotation will be very hard to access.
£ j

Kind-nouns as definites
With this structure for NPs in place, I can be more specific on the function of nouns like "kind", "species" or "size". The main idea is that kind-nouns and size-nouns are the equivalent of definite determiners in the kind-domain. Like "the", "kind" denotes Max, which takes as argument a set and extracts its supremum (or a singleton containing it). The argument is necessarily one of the kind-domain NP denotations, since no maximal element is present in the object denotation, so Max would be undefined.
£ £
Regardless of which kind-domain denotation is chosen, "kind" always returns the same supremum, i.e. animal% for the NP "animal". Just like definite determiners, the various kind-nouns are distinguished only by the presuppositions they induce on their arguments. Each kind/size-noun is well-defined only if the argument it receives is restricted by a certain criterion for forming 'subkinds'. Consider "size", for instance: [size [shirt] ] is well-defined only if the denotation selected for "shirt" is a stripped-down hierarchy that looks like this:
"Species", on the other hand, will be defined only if we are considering subkinds with a 'biological social status', so to speak: 'old tigers' will not count. "Kind" or "type" are not as specific, but they still require the context to select one of the many possible hierarchies. Carlson's observation that you cannot count 'subkind-hood' from different domains (our Bengali, man-eating tiger example) automatically follows from this, since even if the same object does belong to two subkinds, they will not be part of the same hierarchy, and therefore they cannot be counted together.
£ 9
I should stress, at this point, that the parallelism between kinds and definites implies that the taxonomic structure of objects has a cognitively 'privileged' status, manifested in its being encoded in the denotation of NPs. The idea is that, unlike other important world knowledge about objects, such as 'what tigers eat for breakfast', the structure of classes of objects, the ways in which the world can be clustered in coherent groups is manipulated by the grammar much in the same way 'plurality' is-a semantic notion with direct syntactic reflexes. With the structure I have proposed, the residue operator is in fact capable to apply to a superkind and to a kind-domain NP denotation just like it applied to pluralities and sets thereof. The denotation of (76) above can be informally spelled out as follows: (84) The next steps will be to add plurality, and to obtain the right word order, i.e. not "tiger of kind", but "kind of tiger".
Plurality and anti-anaphora
As it stands, (84) cannot deal with number, which requires the application of the Pw0 operator at KIP to derive a set of pluralities. Consider, first, how the semantic derivation proceeds in the simple case of "The tiger".
¤ k ¢
Kind-subkind hierarchies always appear to have discrete nodes; therefore, the kind-domain denotation of an NP will always contain atomic elements (though perhaps some of these atoms may be rather vague, as the criterion for forming 'subkinds' looses its force), even when the object-level denotation has no discernible atomic elements, as it has been argued for mass nouns (Link 1983) . This is why pluralisation of mass nouns invariably tends to select a kind-domain denotation.
¤ ¤
In "The species of [l n m o tigers]", the bare plural "tigers" will presumably denote a set of tigers, from which a biological kind-hierarchy can be derived. "Species" will return a singleton containing the supremum of this hierarchy, and "the" will extract this supremum.
¤ U F
By comparison, suppose that a person who is the world's best bridge player and the world's chess champion is in the room. In this situation, I couldn't claim "There are (the) two best players in this room": like "kind", the superlative selects one and only one dimension to measure things along.
The [5
If "tiger" denotes a set of object-level tigers, KIP will denote the power set of those objects, and PDP (with feature "singular"), the set of all singletons in the power set. "The" presupposes its argument to have a supremum, in this case, a single element; this is only possible if the denotation of the NP was originally restricted by the context so as to denote a single 'salient' tiger. If this restriction can be satisfied, the definite description is successful. Consider on the other hand what happens if the NP takes one of its kind-level denotations, a concrete possibility here, since "tiger" happens to correspond to a 'well-established' kind. This time, Pw generates a lattice of kinds that has the set of all subkinds of tigers as its supremum, and the kind Tiger% as one of its singletons.
£ D
Like before, PDP returns the set of all the singletons; however, this time "the" finds a supremum in the set without any need for the context to intervene: the superkind of the NP denotation, i.e. Tiger% . This automatically derives the singular definite generic meaning in "The tiger (is nearly extinct)". . The motivation for the NP movement itself might be sought in the need to license the empty KIP layer and the PDP above it with some overt material (again, a PF requirement). Alternatively, it might be due to the syntactic deviance of a bare NP (as opposed to 'SDP') in the complement of RP, if this conflict is checked at PF. In either case, NP" is interpreted in its base position, i.e. erased at LF in [Spec,KIP] and at PF in [Compl,RP] ("reconstructed")-which I indicate by using the trace notation.
¤ U G
A qualification is in order. When applied to kinds, Pw 7 will also produce pluralities that do not seem to have a place in natural language. These are those pluralities containing subkinds in a subset relation, like "cats"and "Siamese cats". When kinds are in a subset relationship they cannot be counted as multiple, distinct kinds-just like my hand, its finger and the finger's nail do not score separately in an answer to "How many parts does your arm have?". Perhaps the right place to rule out these problematic pluralities is pragmatics. Alternatively, Pw 7 can include a semantic filter such as: Pw
In what follows, I will assume that these cases have been eliminated from the lattice in one way or another. This entails, among other things, that the superkind Tiger{ will be present in the lattice only within a singleton.
Semantically, the RP returns a set of subkinds of tigers. Pw0 builds the power set of such kinds (excluding 'deviant' pluralities, see footnote 24), which has a supremum, the full collection of all kinds of tiger. Plural "the" may pick this supremum, deriving noun phrases like "the types of industrial activity" seen above in (72). In the singular, however, tiger% is no longer present in the set of singularities, and the intensional nature of the subkinds left in the set offers no guarantees as to which subkind might be picked out by Max as 'the largest'. Therefore, "the kind of tiger" is unacceptable for exactly the same reason why "the friend of John's" is unacceptable, and as in the latter phrase a relative ("The kind of tiger I just mentioned") or an ordering ("The last kind of tiger") improves the situation.
As we have seen in (70), deictics (and, more marginally, possessives) contrast with the simple definite article: "this kind of tiger" is perfect. This difference is at the heart of the property I have called Kind Antianaphora: the context compatible with the simple, unmodified definite article does not seem to be sufficient to produce a supremum. Although various aspects of this property remain unclear, the general line of explanation that I want to propose is that subkinds, unlike objects, are part of a structure, a hierarchy, and as such they are essentially defined by their mutual interrelations with other kinds. Objects can be independently rendered salient by the evolution of the common ground; kinds, on the other hand, are purely information about how objects may be grouped together, each grouping being significant for what it excludes as much as for what it binds. For this reason, a subkind cannot be singled out or brought to focus in the context without bringing in focus the whole hierarchy within which it acquires a meaning. The context does play a role in selecting which hierarchy is activated, whether the 'kind of animal' to consider is 'pig' or 'pork'-but once this choice is made, the kind/subkind structure comes prepackaged. This is not to say, of course, that specific kinds cannot be singled out by bringing to play additional properties they may have. Demonstratives or possessives capitalise on this fact: a demonstrative may pick up a particular kind in virtue of the fact that it has appeared in the previous discourse, or that some of its instances are in sight. Possessives may use the particular 'possessive' relation between a possessor and a kind to identify it ("my type of wine" may be the wine I prefer or the one I have created, though I may have no claim or preference on wine in general). Paradoxically, the very fact of having a cardinality might be one of these properties, judging from the fact that a plural numeral improves anaphoric uses of the article.
£ E
Overall, this case remains puzzling. If this line of analysis proves correct, we have the beginning of an explanation for the distribution in (68)-(75), but we still need to look at the cases in (80), where an NP without any overt kind-noun modifier is interpreted as a set of subkinds. I see two possibilities here: either the NP denotes a set of higher-order properties as its object-domain denotation, or we are still under the structured, kind-level denotation, but if the kind-structure is sufficiently salient an implicit kind-noun is understood.
£ I
If anti-anaphora is due to the presence of a structured domain, we expect that in the former case no such effects should arise, since by hypothesis objectdenotations are just sets, unstructured entities. This could be the case for nouns like "metal" or "alloy", noted in Krifka et al. (1995) ; the article in (87)a seems to me relatively acceptable (hence, no anti-anaphora) even though the singular definite generic is not readily available (that is, no structured kind-domain denotation with a supremum is available without the help of kind-nouns).
(87) a.
Bronze" was introduced more recently. [The metal/alloy]" had good mechanical properties. b. ? With bronze, [the allow]% had been invented.
As for nouns like "whale", which make good singular definite generics but also good 'cognitively salient' subkinds, I suspect that an implicit, generic kind-noun may be at work, selecting the supremum from the kinddomain NP denotation and deriving a set of proper subkinds via residue.
¤ H
The BNC offers other cases where "the two kinds..." appears to be anaphoric, and where the numeral cannot be omitted, e.g. "Art is after all the subject of attention for both critic and historian, even though the functions and methods of the two sorts of writer have drawn apart.".
¤ U Q
If the break-down in kinds/subkinds is hard to get, an over kind-noun must be used: "every old sock" strongly tends to range over concrete socks, unlike "every kind of old-sock". Overt "kind" can thus be seen as an instruction to look harder for natural clusters of objects that at first appear to have none.
This concludes the derivation for the DP "This kind of tiger", in the strong, kind-denoting meaning. In the singular, this is by far the most common form of kind-construction, with 9633 occurrences in the BNC fragment. In the next section I will look at the derivation of the kind-final construction, at the weak (indefinite) reading of the kind-initial form (the one of "There were all kinds of wines at the party") and at some alternative agreement possibilities.
The kind-final order
To derive "a tiger of this kind", we start from the structure for "this kind of tiger" as in (86)b, embedded under a higher RP, and copy the particle "of' and the lower RP containing "tiger" out of the DP. In first approximation, suppose that [g h 5 tiger] is copied to the specifier of an outer RP, and "of", to its head. Neither is pronounced in the lower position. What does the copied RP denote at this point? In the DP, the definite "this" has successfully picked out a particular subkind of tiger, say, the Siberian tiger. But in the presuppositional account of definites, this means that the argument the demonstrative has received (the denotation of PDP) was a singleton containing, of all kinds, just Siberian tiger% . Now, the presuppositions of the demonstrative 'backpropagate', as it were, down the structure: for PDP to contain a singleton, the lower RP must have in turn been a singleton, i.e.
Siberian-tiger%
, due to the intersection of the full set of subkinds of tigers with some property demonstratives can capitalise onsay, 'recent discourse mention'. If this denotation was fed without further elaboration to the specifier of the higher RP, we would get Re0 ( Siberian-tiger% | , Siberian-tiger% ), which yields the empty-set, an unacceptable result. As a backup strategy, suppose that the singleton Siberian-tiger% is converted to an atom and interpreted as the set of its realizations, i.e. the set of all Siberian tigers. The set is copied under a KIP, in the specifier of the higher RP, deriving the structure in (89)a, a combination of the structure for of/z possessive/partitives seen above in (55) and the kind-initial structure in (86) The Pw0 operator associated with KIP derives a lattice of pluralities of object Siberian tigers. This time however, the residue operator leaves this set intact-Siberian-tiger% is simply not a member of the power set of its own realizations. The rest of the derivation proceeds much as in partitives, giving a set of pluralities of tigers, in agreement with the object-level reading of "a tiger of this kind".
£ P
From (89)a, we can now derive the indefinite reading of the kind-initial construction found in "there were [all kinds of people] at the party" or "John has been [every kind of doctor] in his career". The structure, shown in (89)b, adopts Wilkinson's idea that the indefinite meaning is derived by fronting "this kind" to a DP-initial position, here [Spec,PDP] and letting the content noun be unselectively bound by whatever version of existential closure is available on general grounds. Just as with the fronting on "kind" in (86)b, "of" accompanies the movement. (89)b is also consistent with the Italian extraction facts in section 2, example (13)b, where the kind-nominal has moved further up, stranding "of tiger".
As Chris Wilder (p.c.) points out, such 'indefinite' kind-constructions tend to bear stress on the initial nominal ("There were all KINDS of beers"), not on the content noun. The same pattern is found with the N-of-a-N construction ("That IDIOT of a doctor") and with special of/z possessives like "That NOSE of his", suggestive evidence that in all these cases the movement to [Spec,DP] is focus-driven. The latter construction, discussed in Barker (1997) Suppose that (90) and its English counterpart are actually the combination of an of/z possessives with a kind-final construction. We start out from the DP "His nose% ", meaning 'the special nose-kind that has some relation with him'), embedded under an RP, then copy "nose" to [Spec,RP] , inserting a KIP as in the kind-final derivation and
nose] is now interpreted as the power set of object-level noses that realize the kind. "Nose" in the lower SDP is PF-erased. Then, in Italian, the lower DP is fronted and focalised, deriving (91)b; in English, the KIP is fronted from [Spec,RP] and focalised, and "that" is inserted, yielding (91)c. nose] (the kind itself is not in this set), and the singular feature derives the (singleton?) set of 'noses of his kind'. By associating an instance with its kind, the constructions manage to convey a certain universal flavour to an otherwise mundane claim.
Finally, what explains the determiner restrictions in the content nominal seen in (75), section 4? Recall the analysis I proposed for ill-formed of/z possessives like *"My friends of John's", in (63), section 3.2.2. The idea there was that the presuppositions of the possessives "My" and "John's" try to apply to distinct copies of the same object, the KIP "friends"; since mine and John's friend are not necessarily the same people, a clash results. This approach builds on a distinction between presupposition-based restrictors (definites, possibly specific indefinites), and intersection-based ones (weak numerals, relatives clauses), which can simply filter the denotation of their argument, and are always compatible with RP. Applying the same categories to "A tiger of this kind", we see that the combined presuppositions of "this" and "kind" in the lower DP force the content noun "tiger" to exactly denote the extension of a specific kind of tiger. This entails that while a non-presuppositional determiner (an indefinite or "the" with a restrictor) should be acceptable in the higher DP, a presupposition-based one should lead to a clash exactly as it happens in partitives. We see this effect at work with the definites in (68). For instance, in ?? "The tiger" of this kind tiger" ", "this" and "kind" jointly force the extension of "tiger" " to be the full set of, say, Siberian tigers, while "the" requires it to be a single contextually salient tiger, leading to a contradiction.
¤ R
The lack of C-command between the two copies of the lower RC is entirely parallel to the lack of C-command in sentence-wide ellipsis, cf. (53).
Let's take stock. In a singular, definite kind-initial construction like "this kind of tiger", the presuppositions of the definite force the argument RP, containing "tiger", to be a single kind of tiger. The object-level meaning on the kind-final construction can thus be derived by copying this RP to the specifier of a higher RP, interpret it as the set of its members, and apply the usual Pw0 operator to it. The restrictions against an external definite determiner are explained as a clash between the presuppositions of this determiner and the presuppositions of the operators inside the kind-nominal, much as in partitives. Finally, I have suggested that the kind-final construction can be the input for further focus-triggered movement, both in the case of indefinite kind-initial cases ("John has been [every kind of doctor]") and in "that nose of his".
Some considerations on agreement
So far, I have mostly considered cases where both the kind-noun and the content-noun are singular: "This kind of tiger" and "A tiger of this kind". In this section, I want to consider different patterns, with the help of data from the BNC fragment. The results of the searches on the various orders and agreement patterns are summarised in Table 1 .
£ S
Let's begin with last point, potentially a serious drawback for any approach that tries to derive the two orders from the same underlying structure. However, in this system number features play a role only when transmitted to the PDP layer. The working assumption is that, at the KIP level, "tigers" and "tiger" denote the same object, a set of kinds, so that "This kind of tiger" will be synonymous with "This kind of tigers".
£ a
Why is "A tiger of two kinds" out? Intuitively, the reason is that a single object cannot belong to two kinds in the same hierarchy, and "two", unlike "each" cannot raise to take scope over "a tiger". We can formalise this intuition as follows. Suppose "two kinds" is a specific indefinite, which denotes a plurality composed of two kinds of tigers, Siberian and Bengali. Following the presuppositions, this must have originated from an RP denoting the set containing only Siberian and Bengali tigers. The problem arises as we try to convert this set into a single kind-denoting atom, to extract from it the set of tiger-instances: singletons can be converted into atoms, but sets with higher cardinality cannot (after all, which atom could it ever be? Surely not the kind formed by putting together the two kinds in the set-there is no guarantee that such kind exists, and even it is does, extracting it from a plurality might not be so simple)9 g . As a matter of fact, the same problem arises with any non-presuppositional determiner preceding "kind", since this will let RP denote the full set of subkinds. Again, no atom can be derived, so no set of instances can be obtained. This explains the oddness of (92), noted by Carlson.
(92) ? A tiger of a kind is here.
Non-specific "a"
The reason why a consistent plural ("(I have seen) tigers of those kinds") is better than a singular-plural in the same order (19 occurrences vs. 3, with an overt determiner) is that in the first case "tigers" is a dependent plural, as we see in "unicycles have wheels". The content noun is semantically a singular, interpreted in the scope of the lower determiner much as in "(Noah took) an animal of each kind", but the plural features of the internal determiner spread to the content noun. Evidence for transmission of plural features in the other direction, from the content noun to the higher determiner position comes from the (c) cases. Here, the fact that "That/This kind of Nb Another reason why determinerless content nouns are so well represented in (f) and (g) is that they could have been reinterpreted as quasi-universal bare plurals (a necessity to obtain "Tigers of this kind are not so common", though some speakers find this marginal, and reject "Tigers of this type are extinct"). Following Longobardi (1994), I will assume that this meaning is derived by moving the content noun to the strong determiner position (see also Zamparelli 1995)-but I will not try to spell out this movement here.
Conclusions
The theory described in this paper tries to capture a number of intriguing similarities in the structure of partitives, of/z possessives, and kind-denoting DPs. If this approach stands up to further scrutiny, we will be able to derive these constructions from the application of three basic ideas, which it is worth summarising. First, a presuppositional theory of definites, stating, in simple terms, that definites determiners work not because they return a subset of the argument they receive, but because they presuppose that the argument they receive already denotes a properly restricted set of objects. Relative clauses seem to work in quite a different way. Second, a 'local' application of copy-theory with PF erasure, similar to canonical ellipsis, but with the semantic effect of ¤ U q Judgments diverge on the latter case. Note that "This kind of tigers" can also be derived as an indefinite kind-construction, via raising of "this kind" from "tigers of this kind", or by considering "tigers" a full, bare SDP denoting a set of objects, building on it a kind-level denotation similar to the one I have assumed for NPs and feeding it to the kind-noun. This possibility could be independently needed to derive recursive kind-constructions like "A type of species of algae". control constructions. Third, a 'residue' operator which returns the complement-set of an element with respect to a set.
These ideas are mutually dependent. The copy operation wouldn't derive proper partitivity without residue (which in turn is so closely associated with the copy operation that it may ultimately be a semantic reflex of it); the presuppositional approach to definites is crucial for residue to eliminate the supremum and not any other element, to understand the deviance of "My friend of John's" or "This tiger of that kind arrived", and to derive the right semantics for "A tiger of this kind".
Some of the other ideas put forth in the paper are also important. The proposal that NPs do not denote lattices of pluralities to start with, but complex structures formed by objects and by many possible ways to categorise them was instrumental in treating of/z possessives and the kind-initial construction as very similar objects. The idea dove-tails with the idea that kind-nouns are definite-like functions, distinguished by the presuppositions they cast on their arguments, and has implications for the cognitive design of grammar. Subkinds and plurals are manipulated by the same operators with similar effects, but kinds have an additional (and rather puzzling) discourse property, which I have called "anti-anaphora". Anti-anaphora barrs anaphoric uses of the simple definite article with kinds in discourse, an effect that extends to the kind-final construction under the copy derivation I have proposed. Last but not least, the set of facts I have reviewed clearly shows that partitives and kinds make excellent test-beds for any theory of determiners interested in the syntax/semantics interface.
Many side aspects of the theory deserve systematic examination, and several implications have been left unchecked. The treatments of kind-denoting bare plurals, subkind-denoting bare NPs ("every animal% "), NPinternal modifiers and anti-anaphora come to mind. These and other aspects are left for future work.
